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Abstract
A number of issues have emerged related to how
platforms moderate and mitigate “harm.” Although
platforms have recently developed more explicit
policies in regard to what constitutes “hate speech”
and “harmful content,” it appears that platforms often
use subjective judgments of harm that speciﬁcally
pertains to spectacular, physical violence—but harm
takes on many shapes and complex forms. The
politics of deﬁning “harm” and “violence” within these
platforms are complex and dynamic, and represent
entrenched histories of how control over these
deﬁnitions extends to people's perceptions of them.
Via a critical discourse analysis of policy documents
from three major platforms (Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube), we argue that platforms' narrow deﬁnitions of harm and violence are not just insufﬁcient but
result in these platforms engaging in a form of
symbolic violence. Moreover, the platforms position
harm as a ﬂoating signiﬁer, imposing conceptions of
not just what violence is and how it manifests, but
who it impacts. Rather than changing the mechanisms of their design that enable harm, the platforms
reconﬁgure intentionality and causality to try to stop
users from being “harmful,” which, ironically, perpetuates harm. We provide a number of suggestions,
namely a restorative justice‐focused approach, in
addressing platform harm.
KEYWORDS
discourse analysis, harm, platform governance, platform policy,
symbolic violence
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INTRODUCTION
Terms of service and moderation policies have always existed on platforms to some degree,
particularly when it came to illegal content like child sexual exploitation or sale of regulated
goods (drugs, ﬁrearms, etc.). But in recent years, platforms have scrambled to adjust their
policies around what constitutes “harmful content” following a number of tragedies involving
terrorism, mass shootings, and other acts of violence that could be traced to their platforms'
affordances (Daniels, 2018; Odag et al., 2019). Indeed, after years of attempting to absolve
themselves of blame or responsibility for what occurs on their services, platforms like
Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, YouTube, and others have implemented new sweeping policies
that have banned groups, hashtags, and other means of digital connection and coordination
that these platforms afforded (Donovan, 2020a; Ganesh, 2018; Gillespie, 2018; Suzor et al.,
2019). These platforms have had to reckon with their role in radicalization, extremist
organizing, and rampant disinformation that threatens the social fabric of our society; in
particular, the COVID‐19 pandemic, violent white supremacist organizing during Black Lives
Matter protests in the summer of 2020, and the January 6 U.S. Capitol Insurrection.
The repertoires of action platforms adopt in response to these problems—what has been
called governance by platforms (Gillespie, 2017)—exhibit a variety of issues pertaining to
platforms' commercial interests, isomorphic decisionmaking, inﬂuence over perceptions of
their role and responsibilities, and sovereignty over decisions about what constitutes content
or behavior worthy of remediation. In terms of their commercial interests, platforms must
keep their users engaged, which often means ensuring popular accounts remain active and
visible. This has led to inequitable moderation practices, wherein high‐proﬁle accounts
receive greater leniency or complete immunity when it comes to enforcing platform rules
(Caplan & Gillespie, 2020; Horwitz, 2021). Platforms also balance the concerns of their
users with those of advertisers. However, as direct generators of revenue, advertisers'
concerns in relation to moderation policies and practices tend to hold greater sway than that
of average users. Beyond user concerns, platforms tend to develop and lean on AI and
automation for identifying and managing harmful content to minimize costs associated with
human moderation. Yet, these technologies frequently fail at detecting severe instances of
harm that are nuanced and complex (e.g., hate speech; Gorwa et al., 2020).
Platform governance decisions also exhibit isomorphism (Caplan & Danah, 2018), as
platforms adopt similar policy changes simultaneously or one after another. This suggests
decision‐making in response not only to public pressure but also peer pressure. We can see
such peer pressure in, for example, decisions to remove ﬁgures like conspiracy theorist Alex
Jones, former president Donald Trump, and many others who have been identiﬁed as
central ﬁgures in these “harmful” communities that engage in ofﬂine violence (Fischer &
Gold, 2021; Schwartz, 2019). The coevolution of platform policies helps platforms urge
particular normative visions of how and when they should intervene in what their users post
and share based on certain framings of what is “harmful” or “violent” enough to warrant
removal and outright bans.
As platforms learn from each other, many strides have been made in updating policies
around hate speech, harmful content, misinformation, and other forms of malicious content.
Neverthless, it appears that platforms often use subjective judgments of harm that
speciﬁcally pertain to spectacular, physical violence. Such judgments belie the complex
political concepts and processes subsumed by the terms harm and violence (Arendt, 1970;
Bourdieu, 1999; Giroux, 2017). The politics of circumscribing what constitutes “harm,”
“violence,” and “danger” on these platforms are complex and dynamic and represent
entrenched histories of how control over these deﬁnitions extend to people's perceptions of
their signiﬁcance and severity. Through these policies, platforms not only delimit their
responsibility for what their users post and share, but reinforce certain political ideas and
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frames of what constitutes violent or harmful behavior. They govern both discursive and
material expressions of harm. Through this governance, they powerfully shape normative
notions of harm and violence, effectively managing perceptions of their actions and directing
users' understanding of what is “harmful” and what is not.
The purpose of this study is to examine the policies from three major social media
platforms (Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube) to understand the ways that they conceptualize, implement, and enforce harmful and violent content. Through the lenses of Bourdieu's
(1999) symbolic violence framework and Gillespie's conception of governance of and by
platforms (Gillespie, 2017), we conduct a critical discourse analysis of how Facebook,
Twitter, and YouTube deﬁne and police “harm” within their digital milieu. Speciﬁcally, we turn
our attention to publicly accessible policy documents about misinformation, hate speech,
and violent content from these three major platforms to understand how they are
conceptualizing “harm” and their practices to mitigate it via human and machine‐driven
interventions. By open coding documents that substantively address harm and examining
their underlying meaning often hidden in language (Fairclough, 1992, 2014; van Dijk, 1993),
we tease out not only recurrent or similar practices but the discursive contours of deﬁning
and classifying “harmful” content and behavior.
With this analysis, we suggest that platforms' narrow deﬁnitions of harm, violence, and
danger are not just insufﬁcient, but result in these platforms engaging in ideological
hegemony, imposing conceptions of not just what violence is and how it manifests, but who
it impacts and by what mechanisms. We ﬁnd that rather than changing the mechanisms of
their design that enable harm, the platforms reconﬁgure intentionality and causality through
these policy documents in an attempt to stop users from being “harmful,” which, ironically,
perpetuates harm.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Platform governance
Following the aforementioned events brieﬂy touched upon in the introduction, the inﬂuence
of these platforms on the political and civic process have received increased scrutiny
(Gorwa, 2019). Although a number of interventions have been sought in Europe, the United
States, and in other countries to address these issues, the tense relationship between
external political forces and internal practices and actions have come into full view (Flew
et al., 2019; Ganesh & Bright, 2020; Gillespie, 2018). Although initially portrayed and even
marketed as beneﬁcial and democratic technologies, the current political, social, and cultural
situation points to these platforms as having deleterious effects on all of these spheres
(Donovan, 2020a; Hao, 2021; Hemsley et al., 2018). Of course, the relationship between
platform, person, and society is a complex sociotechnical one, and this relationship
inﬂuences and is inﬂuenced by platform governance. How platforms should be governed is a
fraught debate, and the term “platform” is in itself a vague and ambiguous term that allows
these corporations ﬂexibility in how they deﬁne their societal roles and responsibilities
(Gillespie, 2010).
Governance, then, is “less a set of practices than a capacity,” (Gorwa, 2019, p. 856) and
is aligned with platforms' ability to make and enforce rules to moderate the behavior of
users. For platforms and online services and communities that predated them, governance
is often reﬂected in content moderation to prevent abuse and to provide mechanisms for
enforcement like bans and censorship. In our current digital landscape, governance extends
to algorithms, interfaces, as well as terms of service and content policies (Gorwa, 2019;
Plantin et al., 2018). Platforms not only engage in governance at this individual user level,

19442866, 2022, 1, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/poi3.290 by Loyola University Chicago, Wiley Online Library on [21/11/2022]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

POLICY& INTERNET

|

DECOOK

ET AL.

but are political actors that engage and inform their own regulatory frameworks—making
platform governance a “speciﬁc and complex network of interactions spanning different
actors and behaviours” (Gorwa, 2019, p. 856) that includes actors in government,
academics, nongovernmental groups, journalists, and many other stakeholders (Dijck
et al., 2019).
Platform politics and the politics of platforms are enmeshed in our global politics—
intervening in every aspect of ordinary life (Dijck et al., 2019; Gillespie, 2017; Plantin &
Punathambekar, 2019). But platform governance becomes a greater issue when we
consider the ways that platforms govern themselves, leading to the phenomenon that
Gillespie noted as “governance by platforms” (emphasis added; 2017). The importance of
these internal dynamics that then extend outward in the platforms' own policies and
participation in initiatives like that of the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT)
understandably gives critical scholars pause—these actions not only reinforce platforms'
self‐governance, but inﬂuences users' perceptions of the processes that platforms uses to
moderate content and inﬂuences their own behavior (Duguay, 2016; Gorwa, 2019; Myers
West, 2018). This has not resulted only in perfunctory adherence and belief in platform
policies and ability to self govern, referred to as “techlash” (a portmanteau of “technology”
and “backlash”) (Flew et al., 2019).
The issues with content moderation and policies that govern user content and behavior
are global, and the uneven practices of moderation are deeply imbued with discriminatory
beliefs regarding gender, race, ability, sexuality, and gender expression (Gerrard &
Thornham, 2020; Gray et al., 2017; Zolides, 2020). Adding to this complexity, much of the
responsibility of enforcing these policies relies on underpaid contractors (many in the Global
South) (Roberts, 2019) and algorithmic moderation due to the sheer “scale” of content
shared on these platforms daily (Gillespie, 2020; Gorwa et al., 2020; Zolides, 2020).
Governance by platforms entails gendered, racialized, and even sexualized lenses that
often harm the very people that these policies are meant to protect (Gerrard & Thornham,
2020). Hiding behind the “free speech” justiﬁcation and democratic “platform values,”
platforms often engage in neoliberal interpretations of freedom of speech (Hokka, 2021) and
claim to practice “neutrality” in their decisions (Hallinan et al., 2021). In addition,
investigative reports and leaked memos from employees of major platforms point to all of
these “free expression” values being at best hypocritical and at worst manipulative and
negligent. For example, recently revealed internal documents at Facebook showed that
high‐proﬁle users beneﬁt from “freer” expression than ordinary users as they have been
essentially whitelisted in moderation processes (Horwitz, 2021). Earlier reporting similarly
documented inconsistency in YouTube's moderation policies—for example, at one time,
instructing moderators to take down videos depicting drug‐related violence in Mexico, but
not violence related to political conﬂicts in Syria and Russia (Buni & Chemaly, 2016). This
begs the question of what purposes moderation serves and who these practices and actions
(or lack of action) actively harm through trying to prevent harm? As these platforms become
more involved in public activities and everyday life, discussions around platform governance
point to the need for “cooperative responsibility” between platforms, governments, and users
rather than the current model where responsibility falls on the individual platforms
(Helberger et al., 2018). As transnational corporations, the platforms are driven by private
commercial interests, and not strictly by their claims of providing a public and democratic
service (Gillespie, 2018; Helberger et al., 2018), which should be a key factor in examining
their self‐directed regulatory frameworks. Platforms' varying practices and actions to curtail
“harmful content” reveal inherent issues with relying only on platforms to each govern
themselves. These issues may also be visible but in platforms' deﬁnitions of what constitutes
hate speech, violent content, and other forms of harmful content like mis/disinformation and
platform manipulation.
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Moderating hate speech, violence, and harm
Companies tend to take three approaches toward moderating content: artisanal (small
scale, manual), community‐reliant (relying on users to report content), industrial (large scale,
often automated), or some combination of all three (Caplan, 2018). With the amount of
content that is being posted, having clear deﬁnitions of what constitutes hate speech or
violent/harmful content is crucial for having an equal moderation process. But this is
complicated by factors such as cultural context, different languages, and moderators'
inevitable subjectivity (Gillespie, 2018). Hate speech is often deﬁned by hate crime laws in
Western legal frameworks, particularly in the United States, that are often damaging and can
exacerbate rather than help to alleviate the systemic issues that caused harm in the ﬁrst
place (Schoenebeck & Blackwell, 2021). Online harm, however, is more complicated and
complex, taking on multiple forms, and as Schoenbeck and Blackwell noted includes but is
not limited to psychological distress, physical violence, oppression and marginalization, and
threats to free expression (2021). Harassment, ideological harm, and exploitation are also
categories that need to be considered when conceptualizing “harmful content,” (Banko et al.,
2020). Although they may seem more straightforward, even content that seems “objectively”
harmful, like terrorist content, are also abstract and often can ﬂy under the radar of content
moderators due to coded language and other ways of maneuvering around censorship
(Gerrard, 2018; Murthy, 2021).
Harassment and hate speech are often the most highly contested forms of harmful
content despite platforms' attempts to “clearly” deﬁne what constitutes harassment and/or
hate speech on their platforms (Pohjonen, 2019). Hate speech, in particular, is a difﬁcult
term to deﬁne. Evidencing its harms in a way that meets a legal burden of proof is a
signiﬁcant problem that plagues its conceptualization and enforcement (Gelber &
McNamara, 2016). Similarly, harassment in particular is a “harm” that platforms have long
struggled to moderate or meaningfully enforce (Gray, 2020). As Schoenbeck and Blackwell
(2021) noted, the focus of these platforms tends to lean towards removing individual content
and accounts that violate their policies, but this prioritizes retribution over actual structural
changes to the platforms themselves. How social media platforms recognize and repair
harm, then, is a signiﬁcant issue that still persists despite these companies' attempts to
control hate speech, harassment, and other kinds of harm.
Although typologizing the kinds of harms that can occur is necessary to moderate it
(Banko et al., 2020; Banks, 2010), what platforms often fail to do is meaningfully repair what
leads to harmful behavior and content in the ﬁrst place. Moreover, platforms also attempt to
assign point values or quantitatively make decisions on what is or is not harmful content,
which also can lead to overlooking or outright allowing certain harms to persist if they do not
meet a certain numeric threshold, which perpetuates the notion that certain kinds of harms
are prioritized over others (Scheuerman et al., 2021). Despite platforms implementing these
policies and continuing to update what constitutes hate speech and harassment and their
attempts to moderate this kind of content, inconsistencies in these deﬁnitions abound within
platforms as well as across them (Pater et al., 2016).
Expecting platforms to enforce their own policies, particularly around hate speech and
harassment, falls into the issues prevalent in the previous section about regulatory
frameworks and platform governance. Despite evidence that the speech that circulates on
these platforms leads to both online and ofﬂine harms, platforms are largely still left to self‐
regulate, and in doing so control more speech than any government (Benesch, 2020), often
without the knowledge of users (Kalsnes & Ihlbæk, 2020). Due to the extensive global reach
and sheer scale of content that these kinds of platforms have to moderate, the question of
whether online hate is even governable is a valid one (Ganesh, 2018). Indeed, judging from
platform actions and in many cases, inaction, platforms decide what constitutes harm,
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violence, and harassment not just in the United States where many are headquartered, but
globally.

Symbolic and cultural violence
Beyond physical violence, platforms often perpetuate symbolic and cultural violence.
Symbolic violence, as deﬁned by Bourdieu, refers to the ways that power, hierarchies, and
inequalities are maintained less by physical force and more by forms of symbolic
domination, particularly through language and discourse (Bourdieu, 1999; Morgan &
Björkert, 2006). We adopt this framework of symbolic violence to better understand how
social media platform policies perpetuate certain notions of what is legitimate and signiﬁcant
harm through the language presented in their own documents, because they are being
imposed on users via these policies, and can inﬂuence what users perceive or understand to
be “real” or “valid” forms of harm (Gray et al., 2017).
Symbolic violence is powerful because it is insidious and invisible, often because it is
also internalized and silent (Morgan & Björkert, 2006). Social media platforms perpetuate
symbolic violence, in particular, because they are a medium of discourse—they perpetuate
systems of knowledge dictating what can and can not be said, and they are much less
regulated than traditional communication channels (Recuero, 2015). It could be argued that
platforms' consistent self‐regulation is in and of itself a form of symbolic violence, because
they dominate public discourse globally and control it in ways that are often opaque and
unseen (Donovan, 2020b; Suzor et al., 2019). In a way, platforms act like gatekeepers for
audiences by determining appropriate and inappropriate content. Platforms, then, control
and construct reality in ways that tend to favor certain views and modes of power over
others, perpetuating ofﬂine ‐isms and harms in the online world (Gray et al., 2017;
Recuero, 2015).
We extend our framework by also incorporating what Galtung referred to as cultural
violence, particularly as it refers to “those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our
existence … that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence,” (Galtung,
1990, p. 291). As Galtung (1990) notes, cultural violence—similarly to symbolic violence—
can make direct and structural violence look and feel natural. Cultural violence contributes to
acts of violence that fall within the range of more conventional understandings of violence by
“changing the moral color of an act from red/wrong to green/right or at least to yellow/
acceptable” (Galtung, 1990, p. 292). Simply put, cultural violence is a helpful additional
framework in understanding the insidious nature of symbolic violence, in that it helps us go
beyond language to understand how these processes affect the lived experiences of users
both online and ofﬂine. In the rest of this article, we come from these frameworks of symbolic
and cultural violence to examine the ways that platforms conceptualize and govern harm.
Further, we consider how these actions perpetuate structural and systemic violence,
particularly in how they dominate perceptions and discursive notions of “harm,” and how
these discursive formations—as policy and enforcement actions—perpetuate cultural
violence, and serve as a legitimizing force for direct or structural violence.

ME THODS
For this analysis, we collected data in the form of policy documents put forth by three of the
major platforms (Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube). Through keyword searches for “harm”
and its variants (e.g., violence, hate, etc.), we assembled a corpus of 106 documents across
all three platforms (22 for Facebook, 36 for Twitter, and 48 for YouTube). All documents
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were collected between March 2021 and July 2021. It is important to note that these
documents were retrieved after the January 6 U.S. Capitol Insurrection, which increased
scrutiny toward platform policy among other ramiﬁcations. Nonetheless, most policy
documents were not dated, but some offered a “last updated” date that fell within the range
of 2 years.1 Although platform policies are in a constant state of ﬂux, we believe that this
corpus of documents reﬂects the fundamental beliefs and values that guide platforms'
notions of harm and violence that govern platform (in)actions. We included a full list of the
policy documents used for this analysis in Appendix A, and refer to speciﬁc documents by
their assigned number in the ﬁndings and discussion.
Using Bourdieu's (1999) symbolic violence framework and Galtung's (1990) concept of
cultural violence, we conducted a critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2014; van Dijk,
1993) of how the three platforms deﬁne and police “harm” within their digital milieu. Per the
recommendations from Lazar in conducting a feminist critical discourse analysis, we paid
close attention to the power dynamics and asymmetries present within the language of the
policies themselves (Lazar, 2007). Since we were also interested in how platforms
perpetuate symbolic violence, this led us to focus our attention to policy documents about
hate speech, harassment, and “violent/harmful content” (deﬁned broadly by the platforms
themselves) to understand how the platforms are conceptualizing “harm,” and their practices
to mitigate it via human and machine‐driven interventions.
In particular, we view these policies not merely as governing documents but as
discursive acts. Discursive acts, via the language of domination, reproduce certain relations
of power, and we follow Fairclough's (2014) recommendations for critical discourse analy in
that we not only look at the object of analysis (the policy documents) but also consider the
processes in which these objects are viewed and perceived as well as the sociohistorical
conditions that govern them (Fairclough, 2014).
To analyze the documents, we began by each independently conducting a close reading
of a subset of documents, writing analytic memos on initial observations. In this, we focused
on language used around references to “harm” and variant terms (violence, hate, etc.).
Following this, we met to discuss our observations. From this discussion we synthesized
initial codes to capture descriptive categories of harm observed, as well as discursive
framings of harm–namely, the values and ideological presuppositions embedded in linguistic
representations of harm in the documents. After coding additional documents based on
these initial codes, we conducted a cycle of focused coding to tease out higher‐level
recurrent or similar practices across platforms that illuminate the discursive contours of
deﬁning and classifying “harmful” content and behavior.

FI NDINGS
Deﬁning harm
In our analysis, we found that none of the platforms provide a direct deﬁnition of harm.
Instead, harm is described through types of speciﬁc harms or examples of what constitutes
harmful content. For instance, Twitter provides a deﬁnition and examples for “physical,”
“psychological,” and “informational” harms [TW01]. Facebook relies on the characteristics of
harmful actions, including those with the “potential to incite violence” or “impact from
bullying/harassment.” YouTube offers the narrowest description of harm, seeming to limit
potential instances of harm to “physical harm/violence,” “death,” and “inciting hostility.” In
Table 1, we attempt to provide brief descriptions of our observations of how these platforms
seem to deﬁne and conceptualize harm based on our analysis of the policy documents. Of
note, Twitter is the only platform that speciﬁcally had a clear deﬁnition of “harm.”

19442866, 2022, 1, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/poi3.290 by Loyola University Chicago, Wiley Online Library on [21/11/2022]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

POLICY& INTERNET

|

TABLE 1

DECOOK

ET AL.

How platforms deﬁne harm

Facebook

Harm is deﬁned by characteristics: “potential to incite violence,” “efforts to silence/intimidate
others,” “civic harms,” or “impact from bullying/harassment.”

Twitter

Harm is described by its “forms”: “physical,” “psychological,” “informational.” Tiered approach to
determine the severity of harm.

YouTube

Harm is based and deﬁned by speciﬁc examples; as well as economic harm (for creators and
demonetization) not much beyond “physical harm,” and “death,” and “inciting hostility.”

While clear and consistent deﬁnitions of harm were elusive, we did see a patterned
emphasis on normative notions of this concept—namely, an emphasis on child safety,
cyberbullying, sexual content (i.e., pornography), and terrorism, but less meaningful
enagement with other signiﬁcant forms of harm and violence on their sites. Platforms also
focused on harm as it existed in a legal framework, including but not limited to things like
copyright, the sale of regulated goods (ﬁrearms, drugs, etc.), and even defamation (in the
case of YouTube). Similarly, disinformation about “the civic process” was also included in
documents from Twitter and Facebook as a signiﬁcant harm, which is most likely in
response to how these platforms were manipulated to sow discord about elections
worldwide (Benkler et al., 2018; Woolley & Howard, 2018).
For all three platforms, harm is not treated as a discrete concept, but is ﬂexibly qualiﬁed
based on what they view as relevant offenses. As a result, platforms can mold their
deﬁnitions and descriptions of harm according to any instances they deem it to have
occurred. In this way, platforms' use of the terms “harm” and “violence” act as ﬂoating
signiﬁers. According to Laclau, and as explained by Farkas and Schou, a ﬂoating signiﬁer is
“a signiﬁer used by fundamentally different and in many ways deeply opposing political
projects as a means of constructing political identities, conﬂicts and antagonisms,” (Farkas &
Schou, 2018; Laclau, 2005, p. 300). By avoiding clear and stable deﬁnitions of “harm,” “hate
speech,” and “violent content,” the platform can carefully navigate opposing political projects
invoked by these weighty terms, while also instilling hegemonic notions of what constitutes
these ills. And as ﬂoating signiﬁers, these deﬁnitions become involved in political and
hegemonic struggles in who gets to deﬁne what constitutes harm and enforce policies to
prevent it—in essence, it is absorbed into the matrix of domination that is language,
according to Bourdieu's symbolic violence framework.
Through the ways they position “harm,” the platforms also reinforce notions of who and
what is important or most deserving of protection via these policies, and through
enforcement, they reify a certain political order. Rather than sticking to “ﬁxed” categories
constitutive of harm or violence, the platforms seemed to use these terms as concepts that
can be molded and interpreted ﬂexibly to ﬁt their needs at any given moment or within a
speciﬁc context. By rendering “harm” a ﬂoating signiﬁer, platforms can respond agiley to
public opinion and outcry about emergent concerns around harm, rather than binding
themselves to a pre‐established deﬁnition, which would oblige them to proactively address
these emergent concerns. As a linguistic act, the ﬂoating signiﬁer of “harm” contributes to
the symbolic violence that is so insidious because it exists primarily in language—the way
that platforms deﬁne harm affects its perception, for both platforms and users. We can see
this, for example, in how the platforms have adapted their policies to address public
discussion of harms associated with COVID‐19 and election misinformation in 2020
(Coppins, 2020; Donovan, 2020a). Moreover, the speciﬁc labels the platforms devise for
emergent categories of harm also reﬂect ﬂexibility. For example, all three platforms have in
recent years begun referring to “coordinated inﬂuence operations” (YouTube), “coordinated
behavior” (Facebook), and “coordinated inauthentic activity,” as catch‐alls for various harms
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(e.g., conspiracy theories, election interferences, etc.). These terms are described in fairly
abstract language in the documents, which precludes concrete conceptualization.

Hierarchizing harm
We observed an inclination to hierarchize and quantify harm and violence, presumably to
accommodate the platforms' technical infrastructures. Operationalizing harm and violence in
these ways assists automated tracking, identiﬁcation and moderation of such content, which
helps build towards decreased reliance on and investment in human labor. For example, in a
blog post, Twitter described a three‐tiered system (low, moderate, high) to classify the
severity of “coordinated harmful activity,” which emphasizes the quantity of documentation
of such activity [TW01]. In addition to the quantity, this hierarchy also entails the assumption
that low harms, if left unchecked, would most likely not cause additional harm, whereas high
harms would almost certainly lead to additional harm.
Although Twitter utilizes this kind of “hierarchy” for determining the magnitude and
severity of harm, Facebook similarly uses “prevalence” as a metric for gauging the
magnitude of harm. For example, in a blog post, Facebook explained prevalence, writing: “If
a piece of hate speech is seen a million times in 10 min, that's far worse than a piece seen
10 times in 30 min.” Such hierarchies provide the platforms with a structured mechanism to
manage what they consider harmful content. Evaluated content is often designated to one of
these categories, and this categorization helps determine what actions they must take.
However, metricizing harm and violence in these ways oversimpliﬁes the complex ways
harm manifests and differently impacts different people at different times. Further, it can lead
to disproportionate reactions by the platform (either much less or more than what is needed).
And ﬁnally, harm is hierarchized based on its potential to “harm” what these platforms
name as “protected categories” of individuals and/or groups, further illustrating how “harm”
functions as a ﬂoating signiﬁer and the ways that harm is racialized and gendered. The
platforms categorize many groups of people into these protected categories, namely
women, children, racial and ethnic minorities, and religious groups. However, in addition to
these protected categories, which mimic protected groups in U.S. law, the platforms also
emphasize the distinction between private and public ﬁgures. Facebook, for instance, claims
they aim to “distinguish between public ﬁgures and private individuals because [they] want to
allow discussion, which often includes critical commentary of people who are featured in the
news or who have a large public audience” [FB10].
This distinction is enforced by protecting private citizens with additional measures not
applicable to public ﬁgures. In their policies, they name certain kinds of people (e.g., politicians) as
being exempt from some of the platforms' own rules about content, and have admitted to this
tiered system of moderation that goes beyond mere moderation but the creation of what Caplan
and Gillespie (2020) refer to as “tiered governance.” Disinformation about “the civic process” was
also included in documents from Twitter and Facebook as a signiﬁcant harm, which is most likely
in response to how these platforms were manipulated to sow discord about elections in the United
States and beyond. But the policies that platforms created around “harm” tended to focus on
physical, tangible things rather than all the forms that violence can have, and neglected to address
these more abstract conceptions of harm.

The material versus symbolic signiﬁcance of harm
Finally, we saw a discursive positioning of harm as mainly tethered to impacts on the body or
individual freedoms, rather than more abstract impacts of domination. For example, the
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platforms commonly refer to harm in relationship to things like child sexual exploitation,
terrorism, human trafﬁcking, and gore. In this sense, the platforms often deﬁned harm and
violence narrowly in terms of threats to physical survival and wellbeing, or what Galtung
(1990) called “direct violence,” rather than considering how harm and violence exist on a
spectrum. Platforms justiﬁed their policies primarily through references to physical and
psychological impacts. As an example of the former, Facebook wrote in its Dangerous
Individuals and Organizations policy: “In an effort to prevent and disrupt real‐world harm, we
do not allow any organizations or individuals that proclaim a violent mission or are engaged
in violence to have a presence on Facebook” [FB03]. As an example of the latter, YouTube
explained in its “Staying safe on YouTube” document: “YouTube is a place where people
come to share their story, express an opinion, and engage with one another. We want to
ensure creators and viewers feel safe doing so” [YT24]. To a lesser extent, the platforms
also justiﬁed their policies through reference to law and threats to individual rights and
freedoms. For example, in Twitter's Hateful Conduct Policy, the company explained:
“Twitter's mission is to give everyone the power to create and share ideas and information,
and to express their opinions and beliefs without barriers. Free expression is a human right
—we believe that everyone has a voice, and the right to use it” [TW02].
While the various kinds of harms the platforms referred to (e.g., sexual harassment,
bullying, hate speech) are premised on systems of oppression and legitimated by cultural
discourses, the platforms rarely acknowledged this. For example, in Twitter's Sensitive
Media Policy, the platform stated: “We prohibit violent sexual conduct to prevent the
normalization of sexual assault and nonconsensual violence associated with sexual acts”
[TW04]. Here, we see recognition of the link between violent sexual conduct and the
normalization of sexual violence, but no acknowledgment of the ways race, gender, class,
and other structural inequalities pattern normalization. In this way, sexual violence is
abstracted from its political context. While the platforms all routinely make references to
special attention to protected groups (primarily children, racial and ethnic minorities,
religious groups, and members of the LGBTQ + community), these guidelines seem to
respond more to legal imperatives than a commitment to counteracting or undermining
systems of power.
The platforms' emphasis on threats to bodies, psychological well being, and individual
freedoms, could be read as a means of deﬂecting attention from the less tangible but more
complex symbolic violence perpetrated on their sites (Massanari, 2015; Recuero, 2015). For
instance, in a report on “harmful stereotypes,” Facebook casually stated that the direct
causality between such content on the platforms and “real world” violence is “uncertain.”2
Such rhetoric urges the idea that “real” harm does not occur on the platforms and, therefore,
they should not be held responsible for it. In other words, they position the most signiﬁcant
harm as occurring “ofﬂine” or in the “real world” and implicitly disavow accusations that their
sites contribute in any way to upholding white supremacy, sexism, ableism, and so on.
Ultimately, the platforms take a pragmatic stance that protects them from legal trouble by
bounding their responsibility for harm to surface‐level matters which can be easily
documented and have a direct link to activity on their sites, perpetuating the framing that
they are not responsible for the content posted by its users (Gillespie, 2010).

DISCUSSION
Our above ﬁndings suggest a reactive approach by platforms to deﬁning and addressing
harm and violence, one that serves the platforms more than society. By sticking close to
deﬁnitions of harm as (ﬂexibly) visible and tangible, they give the appearance of
attentiveness while avoiding controversy. Moreover, a positioning of harm and violence in
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terms of quantiﬁability and physicality suggests a surface‐level approach that underplays the
impact and ignores the interrelatedness of different forms of harm and violence (physical,
emotional, psychological, symbolic) and of violence and power. By rendering “harm” a
ﬂoating signiﬁer, the platforms preclude stable understanding of what kinds of harmful
content they moderate. In some ways, this ﬂexibility is necessary, given that platforms
cannot anticipate all possible expressions of harm. However, it also challenges means of
holding the platforms accountable because the rules they set are vague and transient. Our
analysis included an analysis of only the English‐language documentation and policies of
these platforms, but we anticipate that many of these ﬁndings will translate in other contexts
due to the fact that these are U.S.‐based companies driven by certain cyberlibertarian ideals
(e.g., Barbrook & Cameron, 1996).
As platforms have matured, harms they routinely engender or contribute to have come
into focus. Like in the case of the Gamergate harassment campaign, symbolic violence is
perpetuated on marginalized communities, particularly women and people of color, within
these online and ofﬂine spaces (Gray et al., 2017). In these spaces and the technology
sector, women and other marginalized groups are often rendered invisible, and face
symbolic violence in regular, day‐to‐day experiences, with racist and sexist language
permeating throughout these platforms (2017). Despite attempts by platforms to control hate
speech, the very mechanisms by which they attempt to moderate them create sexist
assemblages (Gerrard & Thornham, 2020), perpetuating normative and oversimpliﬁed ideas
about gender identity.
Content moderation, despite its “best intentions,” perpetuates inequality and symbolic
violence as a result of this necessity of oversimpliﬁcation that occurs due to reliance on
automated moderation. But this means that some harms that are positioned as
unforeseeable and unavoidable actually may be discernible and preventable with adequate
degrees of attention and resources (Parvin & Pollock, 2020). External accountability for how
platforms scope their work related to harm can be facilitated by greater transparency into the
evolution of their policy documents. For example, while writing this article, Facebook
migrated its community guidelines to a new website, where the company shared multiple
versions of the policy documents over time, noting changes. This kind of transparency can
help stakeholders better assess the integrity and intent of platform conceptualizations of
harm. Though, we should be careful not to overlook the fact that such transparency reports
are also usually written by the platforms themselves. As the platforms bound their
responsibility for harm (though mutably), they also shift attention away from the most deep‐
seated and invariant harms, namely those that fall under the category of symbolic violence.
As Recuero (2015) argued, platforms have granted symbolic violence “superpowers.” Yet, in
the policy documents analyzed in this study, this point is carefully buried, which tracks with
the platforms' efforts to shape academic and public discourse about their societal impacts
(Abdalla & Moustafa, 2021), for example downplaying and obscuring internal reports on
political polarization (Horwitz & Seetharaman, 2020) and teen mental health (Seetharaman
et al., 2021).
Overall, platforms frame their enforcement as a desire to protect the “well being” of their
users. However, the abstract nature of well being presents another ﬂoating signiﬁer—“well”
stands in for a wide range of states. As noted above, these ﬂoating signiﬁers are intangible
and hard to deﬁne which makes oversight and regulation challenging. In allowing
themselves the ﬂexibility to adapt to societal occurrences, platforms position themselves
as accommodating public needs. However, such reactive tactics can present a slippery
slope when needing to determine a trajectory for overarching wellbeing. These concerns are
not assuaged, but rather heightened by platform's increasing self‐governance, like
Facebook's own “Oversight Board,” established in 2018, which admitted to their failures
to implement platform policies and that Facebook had concealed a number of things from
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the public (Nover, 2021). Included in these series of reports was the revelation that after
attempts to create a “healthier” community, the platform actually became more toxic
because Zuckerberg repeatedly refused proposals to ﬁx these issues (Hagey &
Horwitz, 2021).
During the same time period, the CEO of Instagram Adam Mosseri appeared in a podcast and
compared social media platforms to cars, saying: “Cars have positive or negative outcomes… We
know that more people die than would otherwise because of car accidents. But by and large, cars
create way more value in the world than they destroyed. And I think social media is similar,”
(Kafka, 2021). Facebook, in a similar vein, rather than correcting the harms that the platform has
produced and strengthened, is opting to defend its image by pushing “Facebook‐positive” stories
to users' feeds (Mac & Frenkel, 2021). These acts of blatant dismissal and defense, and
statements like Mosseri's, demonstrate the ways that, for platforms, deﬁning “harm” represents an
actuarial equation—the principal concern is harm to their proﬁts and public image rather than
harm to the possibility of a just society. The violence perpetuated in Mosseri's analogy justiﬁes
harm to serve an abstract “greater good,” forcing people to accept the platforms' lack of
moderation as a natural and unchanging reality, perpetuating the symbolic violence of social
media. Yet, it is unclear whom this greater good serves.
Mosseri's quote also highlights the ways that the rhetoric of “unintended consequences”
is used to defend the consequences of these technologies, and these phenomena are often
deemed too difﬁcult, costly, or complicated to deal with until they become problems for
others (Parvin & Pollock, 2020). Facebook, similarly, is doubling down and refusing to
apologize further but rather going on the defensive with its own PR strategy, as mentioned in
the previous section. To claim that all of these platform ills are the result of “unintended
consequences” further absolves the platforms of any blame (Gillespie, 2010; Parvin &
Pollock, 2020) and makes it appear as if they were unaware of the adverse effects, which is
far from the truth. By deﬂecting blame, platforms can continue business as usual, and not
face any real accountability for the harms that they continue to produce despite their claims
that they were attempting to correct these “harms” facilitated and afforded by their services.
As a result, platforms get to control the language used and perception of “harm” on their
services, rationalizing these harms. Symbolic violence is what occurs as a result, and
upholds systemic and structural violence that occurs in ofﬂine worlds. By applying the
framework of symbolic and cultural violence, we hope to demonstrate how an analysis of
platform policies' language can continue to shed light on the ways that they perpetuate
inequality and marginalization, and how it shapes social media governance.

Implications for policy and possible solutions
The formulation of harm‐related policies put forth by platforms provides insights into their
ideologies and philosophies surrounding their own role in the media ecosystem and society
at large. As we observed above, platforms primarily seem to take reactive measures rather
than pre‐emptive action and their approach belies a central interest in self‐preservation
above repairing systemic harms. As noted by Schoenebeck and Blackwell, this is akin to
Western frameworks of criminal justice that focus on identifying perpetrators of harm and
punishing them, and which largely “overlook the needs and interests of targets of
harassment and remove offenses and offenders from the community without any attempt
at rehabilitation (Schoenebeck & Blackwell, 2021, p. 14). Such a paradigm equates
unintentional rule‐breaking with intentional acts of harm and leaves no space for
reeducation, rehabilitation, or forgiveness. Moreover, it draws attention away from attempts
to understand the impact of harm, what those experiencing harm might need, and how
platforms could revise their systems accordingly (2021).

19442866, 2022, 1, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/poi3.290 by Loyola University Chicago, Wiley Online Library on [21/11/2022]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

74

|

75

Similarly Baker et al. (2020) note the need to acknowledge the shortcomings of
algorithms and automated processes while addressing the uncertainty of science and real‐
time data. They observe that, conceptually, harm is not neutral and content moderation can
be manipulated to propagate values or cultivate doubt, suggesting a need to move beyond
removal of harmful content on the basis of ofﬁcial advice (2020). Another possibility is
through a restorative form of justice which includes “mediated conversations between those
who perpetrate and those who experience harm, typically with mediators and community
members actively participating” (Schoenebeck & Blackwell, 2021). Such a system includes
perpetrators by having them acknowledge and express remorse for wrongdoing. Certainly,
community‐based restorative justice is more time‐intensive, but would produce better
outcomes by centering those experiencing harm, which would re‐focus energy on more
meaningfully addressing “harm” on these platforms. Policies that would come out of a
restorative justice framework would require imagination, commitment, and accountability ‐
as well as require platforms to no longer deﬂect blame by identifying their platform ills as
“unintended.”
And ﬁnally, platforms cannot self‐regulate to the extent that they do currently, and must
be more willing to share raw data with researchers—not strategically scoped or cleaned
data, in the case of Facebook (Lyons, 2021)—allow external audits and investigations, and
more government regulation of these platforms is needed. However, it must be
acknowledged that governments and the state are holders and perpetrators of violence
themselves, and so relying on them to regulate these platforms may further exacerbate
cultural, symbolic, and material violence. As a result, it is not only important but necessary to
coconstruct platform governance models through participatory action research, where the
communities who are most harmed by these platforms contribute to research and policy
interventions. Advocacy groups, academics, and journalists can help with highlighting and
making others aware of these issues, giving a voice to these often overlooked but
purportedly “protected” groups.
These suggestions are but a few in the wider area of platform governance research, and
our analysis adds to these conversations by examining the policies of these platforms and
how accountability is made elusive in the policies themselves. These discursive positionings
perpetuate ideologies that reify symbolic and cultural violence, which often can and does
become physical violence as we have seen historically and also in our current sociopolitical
moment. Platforms can no longer hide behind the ﬂexibility and slipperiness of these
moderation policies to avoid doing anything more meaningful. In conclusion, they must be
truly and radically transparent, and no longer operate “in the shadows” (Donovan, 2020a,
2020b) or deﬂect criticism and create policies through their own regulatory frameworks and
“oversight boards.” These pursuits can no longer be legitimized, and must consider ethical
questions to guide their design rather than having “ethics” serve as a regulatory practice that
is used to adjust their services after‐the‐fact (Parvin & Pollock, 2020). Platforms must
consider restorative justice and ethics to be at the heart of their design rather than as ad‐hoc
elements, and no longer marginalize these kinds of frameworks and practices.
ENDNOTES
1

After data collection ceased, Facebook re‐launched its policy documents on its transparency website
(transparency.fb.com), making multiple versions of the policy documents available by date.
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https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/PPF_08.11.2020_Harmful-Stereotypes.pdf
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